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Abstract—We present a logical framework for the verification
of relational properties in imperative programs. Our frame-
work reduces verification of relational properties of imperative
programs to a validity problem in trace logic, an expressive
instance of first-order predicate logic. Trace logic draws its
expressiveness from its syntax, which allows expressing properties
over computation traces. Its axiomatization supports fine-grained
reasoning about intermediate steps in program execution, notably
loop iterations. We present an algorithm to encode the semantics
of programs as well as their relational properties in trace logic,
and then show how first-order theorem proving can be used
to reason about the resulting trace logic formulas. Our work
is implemented in the tool RAPID and evaluated with examples
coming from the security field.
I. INTRODUCTION
Program verification generally focuses on proving that all
executions of a program lie within a specified set of execu-
tions, that is, properties are seen as sets of traces. However, this
approach is not general enough to capture various fundamental
properties, such as non-interference [1] and robustness [2].
These notions are naturally modelled as relational properties,
that is as properties over sets of pairs of traces. Relational
properties are special instances of hyperproperties [3], which
are formally defined as sets of sets of traces.
Verification of relational properties can be achieved in
different ways. One approach is by reduction to program veri-
fication: given a program P and a hyperproperty φ, construct a
programQ and a property ψ, such that: (i) Q verifies ψ and (ii)
Q verifies ψ implies P verifies φ. The main advantage of this
approach is that (i) can be verified using standard verification
tools, whereas (ii) is proved generically for the method used
for constructing Q, for instance self-composition [4], [5]
and product programs [6], [7]. Another approach to verify
relational properties is to use relational Hoare logic [8] or
specialized logics that target specific properties [9]. While both
approaches have been applied successfully in several use cases,
they suffer from fundamental limitations: (i) they are typically
not efficient enough to scale to large programs and (ii) they
are only partly automated and tailored to specific properties.
Contributions.In this paper, we develop a new approach
based on reduction to first-order reasoning, with the intent
of reconciling expressiveness and automation.
(1) We introduce and formally characterize trace logic L, an
instance of many-sorted first-order logic with equality, which
allows expressing properties over program locations, loop
iterations, and computation traces (Section IV).
1 func main()
2 {
3 const Int[] a;
4 const Int alength;
5
6 Int i = 0;
7 Int hw = 0;
8
9 while (i < alength)
10 {
11 hw = hw + a[i];
12 i = i + 1;
13 }
14 }
Fig. 1: Motivating example.
(2) We encode the semantics of programs as well as relational
program properties in L (Section IV). Specifically, given
a program P and a relational property F , we construct a
first-order formula ξ in L such that validity of ξ entails
that P satisfies F . Note that this semantic characterization
stands in contrast with methods based on product programs,
Hoare logics, and relational Hoare logics, where verification
is syntax-directed.
(3) We show that relational properties, such as non-
interference, can naturally be encoded in trace logic
(Section V).
(4) We implemented our approach in the RAPID tool, which
relies on the first-order theorem prover Vampire [10]. We
conducted experiments on security-relevant hyperproperties,
such as non-interference and sensitivity. Our results show
that RAPID is more expressive than state-of-the-art non-
interference verification tools and that Vampire is better suited
to the verification of security-relevant hyperproperties than
state-of-the-art SMT-solvers like Z3 and CVC4.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
We motivate our work with the simple program of Figure 1.
This program iterates over an integer-valued array a and stores
in the variable hw the sum of array elements. If a is a bitstring,
then this program leaks the so-called Hamming weight of a in
the variable hw. Our aim is to prove the following relational
property over two arbitrary computation traces t1 and t2 of
Figure 1: if the elements of the array variable a in t1 are
component-wise equal to the elements of a in t2 except for
two consecutive positions k and k + 1, for some k, and the
elements of a in t1 at positions k, k+1 are swapped versions
of the elements of a in t2 (that is, the k-th element of a in t1
is the (k + 1)-th element of a in t2 and vice-versa), then the
program variable hw is the same at the end of t1 and t2. We
formalize this property as
∀kI.
((
∀pos I.((pos 6≃ k ∧ pos 6≃ k + 1)→
a(pos , t1)≃ a(pos , t2)) ∧ a(k, t1)≃ a(k + 1, t2)
∧ a(k, t2)≃ a(k + 1, t1) ∧ 0 ≤ k + 1 < alength
)
→ hw(end, t1)≃ hw(end, t2)
)
,
(1)
where kI and pos I respectively specify that k and pos are
of sort integer I. Further, a(pos , ti) denotes the value of the
element at position pos of a in trace ti, whereas end refers to
the last program location of Figure 1 (that is, line 14).
Property (1) is challenging to verify, since it requires
theory-specific reasoning over integers and it involves alterna-
tion of quantifiers, as the length of the array a is unbounded
and the k-th position (corresponding to the swap) is arbitrary.
To understand the difficulty in automating such kind of reason-
ing, let us first illustrate how humans would naturally prove
property (1). First, split the iterations of the loop of Figure 1
into three intervals: (i) The interval from the first iteration of
the loop to the iteration where i has value k, (ii) the interval
from the iteration where i has value k to the iteration where i
has value k+2, and (iii) the interval from the iteration where
i has value k + 2 to the last iteration of the loop. Next, for
each of the intervals above, one proves that the equality of
the value of hw in traces t1 and t2 is preserved; that is, if
hw has the same value in t1 and t2 at the beginning of the
interval, then hw also has the same value in t1 and t2 at the
end of the interval. In particular, for the first and third intervals
one uses inductive reasoning, to conclude the preservation
of the equality across the whole interval from the step-wise
preservation in the interval of the equality of the value hw
in traces t1 and t2. Further, for the second interval, one uses
commutativity of addition to prove that the value of hw in
traces t1 and t2 is preserved. By combining that the values
of hw in traces t1 and t2 are preserved in each of the three
intervals, one finally concludes that property (1) is valid.
While the above proof might be natural for humans, it is
challenging for automated reasoners for the following reasons:
(i) one needs to express and relate different iterations in the
execution of the loop in Figure 1 and use these iterations
to split the reasoning about loop intervals; (ii) one needs to
automatically synthesize the loop intervals whose boundaries
depend on values of program variables; and (iii) one needs to
combine theory-specific reasoning with induction for proving
quantified properties, possibly with alternations of quantifiers.
In our work we address these challenges: we introduce trace
logic, allowing us to express and automatically prove relational
properties, including property (1). The key advantages of trace
logic are as follows.
(i) In trace logic, program variables are encoded as unary and
binary functions over program execution timepoints. This way,
we can precisely express the value of each program variable
at any program execution timepoint, without introducing
abstractions. For Figure 1, for example, we write hw(end, t1)
to denote to the value of hw in trace t1 at timepoint end.
(ii) Trace logic further allows arbitrary quantification over
iterations and values of program variables. In particular,
we can express and reason about iterations that depend
on (possibly non-ground) expressions involving program
variables. We use superposition-based first-order reasoning to
automate static analysis with trace logic and derive first-order
properties about loop iterations, possibly with quantifier
alternations. For Figure 1, we generate for example the
property ∃itN.
(
it < n9 ∧ i(l9(it), t1)≃ k
)
, where l9 denotes
the location where the loop condition is tested and n9 denotes
the first iteration of the loop upon which the loop condition
does not hold anymore.
(iii) We guide superposition reasoning in trace logic by using a
set of lemmas statically inferred from the program semantics.
These lemmas express inductive properties about the program
behavior. To illustrate such lemmas, we first introduce the
following notation. For an arbitrary program variable v, let
Eqv(it) denote that v has the same value in both traces
at iteration it of the loop. For example, for every program
variable v of Figure 1, we introduce the following definition:
Eqv(it) := v(l9(it), t1)≃ v(l9(it), t2).
In particular, for variable hw, we introduce:
Eqhw(it) := hw(l9(it), t1)≃ hw(l9(it), t2).
We then derive the following inductive lemma for each pro-
gram variable v:
∀itBN.
((
Eqv(0) ∧ ∀itN.((it < itB ∧Eqv(it))
→ Eqv(succ(it)))
)
→ Eqv(itB)
)
,
(2)
where itBN and itN denote iterations itB, it and succ(it)
denotes the successor of it. Lemma (2) asserts that if v has
the same value in traces t1 and t2 at the beginning of the loop
(that is, at iteration 0) and if the values of v are step-wise
equal in traces t1 and t2 up to an arbitrary iteration itB, then
the values of v are equal in traces t1 and t2 at iteration itB
(and hence the values of v are preserved in t1 and t2 for the
entire interval up to itB). For Figure 1, we generate lemma (2)
for hw as:
∀itBN.
((
Eqhw(0) ∧ ∀itN.((it < itB ∧ Eqhw(it))
→ Eqhw(succ(it)))
)
→ Eqhw(itB)
)
.
(3)
Note that lemma (2), and in particular lemma (3) for hw, is
crucial for proving that the values of hw in traces t1 and t2
are the same up to iteration k, as considered in the relational
property of (1). With this lemma at hand, we automatically
prove property (1) of Figure 1, using superposition reasoning
in trace logic.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section fixes our terminology and programming model.
A. First-order logic
We consider standard many-sorted first-order logic with
equality, where equality is denoted by ≃ . We allow all
standard boolean connectives and quantifiers in the language
and write s 6≃ t instead of ¬(s≃ t), for two arbitrary first-
order terms s and t. A signature is any finite set of symbols.
We consider equality ≃ as part of the language; hence, ≃
is not a symbol. We write F1, . . . , Fn  F to denote that the
formula F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn → F is a tautology. In particular, we
write  F , if F is valid.
By a first-order theory, or simply just theory, we mean the
set of all formulas valid on a class of first-order structures.
When we discuss a theory, we call symbols occurring in the
signature of the theory interpreted, and all other symbols
uninterpreted. In our work, we consider the combination
(union) N ∪ I of the theory N of natural numbers and the one I
of integers. The signature of N consists of standard symbols 0,
succ, pred and <, respectively interpreted as zero, successor,
predecessor and less. Note that N does not contain interpreted
symbols for (arbitrary) addition and multiplication. We use
the theory N to represent and reason about loop iterations
(see Section IV). The signature of I consists of the standard
integer constants 0, 1, 2, . . . and integer operators +, ∗ and <.
We use the theory I to represent and reason about integer-
valued program variables (see Section IV). Additionally we
use two (uninterpreted) sorts as two sets of uninterpreted
symbols: (i) the sort Timepoint, written as L, for denoting
(unique) timepoints in the execution of the program and (ii)
the sort Trace, written as T, for denoting computation traces
of a program.
Given a logical variable x and sort S, we write xS to
denote that the sort of x is S. We use standard first-order
interpretations/models modulo a theory T , for example modulo
N ∪ I. We write T F to denote that F holds in all models of
T (and hence valid). If I is a model of T , we write I T F
if F holds in the interpretation I .
B. Programming Model W
We consider programs written in a standard while-like
programming language, denoted as W , with mutable and
constant integer- and integer-array-variables. The languageW
includes standard side-effect free expressions over booleans
and integers. Each program inW consists of a single top-level
function main, with arbitrary nestings of if-then-else and
while-statements. For simplicity, whenever we refer to loops,
we mean while-loops. For each statement s, we refer to while-
statements in which s is nested in as enclosing loops of s.
The semantics of W is formalized in Section IV-C.
IV. TRACE LOGIC
We now introduce the concept of trace logic for expressing
both the semantics and (relational) properties of W-programs.
A. Locations and Timepoints
We consider a program in W as a set of locations, where
each location intuitively corresponds to a point in the program
at which an interpreter can stop. That is, for each program
statement s, we introduce a program location ls. We denote
by lend the location corresponding to the end of the program.
As program locations can be revisited during program
executions, for example due to the presence of loops, we model
locations as follows. For each location ls corresponding to a
program statement s, we introduce a function symbol ls with
target sort L in our language, denoting the timepoint where the
interpreter visits the location. For each enclosing loop of the
statement s, the function symbol ls has an argument of type
N; this way, we distinguish between different iterations of the
enclosing loop of s. We denote the set of all such function-
symbols ls as SigTp. When s is a loop, we additionally
include a function symbol ns with target sort N and an
argument of sort N for each enclosing loop of s. This way, ns
denotes the iteration in which s terminates for given iterations
of the enclosing loops of s. We denote the set of all such
function symbols ns as Sign.
Example 1: Consider Figure 1. We abbreviate each state-
ment s by the line number of the first line of s. We use l6 to
refer to the timepoint corresponding to the first assignment
of i in the program. We denote by l9(0) and l9(n9) the
timepoints corresponding to evaluating the loop condition in
the first and, respectively, last loop iteration. Further, we write
l11(it) and l11(succ(0)) for the timepoint corresponding to
the beginning of the loop body in the it-th and, respectively,
second iteration of the loop. Note that succ(0) is a term
algebra expression of N.

For simplicity, let us define terms over the most commonly
used timepoints. First, define its to be a function, which
returns for each while-statement s a unique variable of sort N.
Second, let s be a statement, let w1, . . . , wk be the enclosing
loops of s and let it be an arbitrary term of sort N.
tps := ls(it
w1 , . . . , itwk) if s is not while-statement
tps(it) := ls(it
w1 , . . . , itwk , it) if s is while-statement
lastIts := ns(it
w1 , . . . , itwk) if s is while-statement
Third, let s be an arbitrary statement. We refer to the timepoint
where the execution of s has started (parameterized by the
enclosing iterators) by
starts :=
{
tps(0) if s is while-statement
tps otherwise
Fourth, for an arbitrary statement s, let ends denote the time-
point which follows immediately after s has been evaluated
completely (including the evaluation of substatements of s):
ends :=


starts′ if s′ occurs after s in a context
ends′ if s is last st. in if-branch of s′
ends′ if s is last st. in else-branch of s′
tpw(succ(it
w)) if s is last st. in body of w
lend otherwise
B. Program Variables and Expressions
In our setting, we reason about program behavior by ex-
pressing properties over program variables v. To do so, we
capture the value of program variables v at timepoints (from
L) in arbitary program execution traces (from T). Hence, we
model program variables v as functions v : (L × T) 7→ I,
where v(tp, tr) gives the value of v at timepoint tp, in trace
tr. If the program variable v is an array, we add an additional
argument of sort I, which corresponds to the position at which
the array is accessed. We denote by SV the set of such
introduced function symbols denoting program variables. We
finally model arithmetic constants and program expressions
using integer functions.
Note that our setting can be simplified for (i) non-mutable
variables – in this case we omit the timepoint argument in the
function representation of the variable; (ii) for non-relational
properties about programs – in this case, we only focus on
one computation trace and hence the trace argument in the
function from SV can be omitted.
Example 2: Consider again Figure 1. By i(l6, tr) we refer to
the value of program variable i in trace tr at the moment be-
fore i is first assigned. We use alength(tr) to refer to the value
of variable alength in trace tr. As a is unchanged in the
program, we write a(i(l11(it), tr), tr) for the value of array a
in trace tr at position pos , where pos is the value of i in trace
tr at timepoint l11(it). In case a would have changed during
the loop, we would have written a(l11(it), i(l11(it), tr), tr)
instead. We denote by i(l12(it), tr) + 1 the value of the
expression i+1 in trace tr at timepoint l12(it). 
Consider now an arbitrary program expression e. We write
JeK(tp, tr) to denote the value of e at timepoint tp, in trace
tr. With these notations at hand, we introduce two definitions
expressing properties about values of expressions e at arbitrary
timepoints and traces. Consider now v ∈ SV , that is a function
denoting a program variable v, and let tp1, tp2 denote two
timepoints. We define: Eq(v, tp1, tp2) :={
∀pos
I
. v(tp1, pos , tr)≃ v(tp2, pos , tr), if v is array
v(tp1, tr)≃ v(tp2, tr), otherwise
(4)
That is, Eq(v, tp1, tp2) in (4) states that the program variable
v has the same values at tp1 and tp2. We also define:
EqAll(tp1, tp2) :=
∧
v∈SV
Eq(v, tp1, tp2), (5)
asserting that all program variables have the same values at
the two timepoints tp1 and tp2.
C. Semantics of W
We now describe the semantics of W expressed in our
trace logic L. To do so, we state trace axioms of L capturing
the behavior of possible program computation traces and then
define L.
In what follows, we consider an arbitrary but fixed program
P in W , and give all definitions relative to P . Note that our
semantics defines arbitrary executions, which are modeled by
a free variable tr of sort T.
a) Main-function: Let s1, . . . ,sk be statements and P
be a program with top-level function func main {s1; . . . ;s
k}. The semantics of P is defined by the conjunction of the
semantics of the statements si in the top-level function and
is the same for each trace. That is:
JP K :=
k∧
i=1
JsiK. (6)
The semantics of P is then defined by structural induction,
by asserting trace axioms for each program statement s, as
follows.
b) Skip: Let s be a statement skip. The evaluation of s
has no effect on the value of the program variables. Hence:
JsK :=
∧
v∈SV
Eq(v, ends, tps) (7)
c) Integer assignments: Let s be an assignment v = e,
where v is an integer program variable and e is an expression.
We reason as follows. The assignment s is evaluated in one
step. After the evaluation of s, the variable v has the same
value as e before the evaluation, and all other variables remain
unchanged. Hence:
JsK := v(ends)≃ JeK(tps, tr) ∧
∧
v′∈SV \{v}
Eq(v′, ends, tps) (8)
d) Array assignments: Let s be an assignment a[e1] =
e2, where a is an array variable and e1,e2 are expressions.
We consider that the assignment is evaluated in one step. After
the evaluation of s, the array a has the same value as before
the evaluation, except for the position pos corresponding to
the value of e1 before the evaluation, where the array now
has the value of e2 before the evaluation. All other program
variables remain unchanged and we have:
JsK := ∀pos I.(pos 6≃ e1(tps, tr) →
a(ends, pos , tr)≃ a(tps, pos , tr)) (9a)
∧ a(ends, e1(tps, tr))≃ e2(tps, tr) (9b)
∧
∧
v∈SV \{a}
Eq(v, ends, tps) (9c)
e) Conditional if-then-else Statements: Let s be the
statement: if(Cond){s1; . . . ;sk} else {s1‘; . . . ;sk‘‘}. The
semantics of s is defined by the following two properties:
(i) entering the if-branch and/or entering the else-branch does
not change the values of the variables, (ii) the evaluation in the
branches proceeds according to the semantics of the statements
in each of the branches. Thus:
JsK := JCondK(tps)→ EqAll(starts1 , tps) (10a)
∧ ¬JCondK(tps)→ EqAll(start
′
s1
, tps) (10b)
∧ JCondK(tps)→ Js1K ∧ · · · ∧ JskK (10c)
∧ ¬JCondK(tps)→ Js1
′K ∧ · · · ∧ Jsk′
′K (10d)
f) While-Loops: Let s be the while-statement while(
Cond){s1; . . . ;sk}.We refer to Cond as the loop condition.
We use the following four properties to defined the semantics
of s: (i) the iteration lastIts is the first iteration where the loop
condition does not hold, (ii) entering the loop body does not
change the values of the variables, (iii) the evaluation in the
body proceeds according to the semantics of the statements
in the body, (iv) the values of the variables at the end of
evaluating s are the same as the variable values at the loop
condition location in iteration lastIt(s). We then have:
JsK :=
∀itsN. (it
s < lastIts → JCondK(tps(it
s))) (11a)
∧ ¬JCondK(tp(lastIts)) (11b)
∧ ∀itsN. (it
s < lastIts → EqAll (starts1 , tps(it
s)) (11c)
∧ ∀its
N
. (its < lastIts → (Js1K ∧ · · · ∧ JskK) (11d)
∧ EqAll (ends, tps(lastIts)) (11e)
D. Trace Logic L
We now have all ingredients to define our trace logic L,
allowing us to reason about both relational and non-relational
properties of programs.
Let STr be a set {t1, t2, . . . } of nullary function symbols
of sort T. Intuitively, these symbols denote traces and allow us
to express relational properties. The signature of L contains
the symbols of the theories N and I together with symbols
introduced in Section IV-A-IV-B, that is symbols denoting
timepoints, last iterations in loops, program variables and
traces. Formally,
Sig(L) := (SN ∪ SI) ∪ (STp ∪ Sn ∪ SV ∪ STr).
Recall that the semantics of W is defined by the trace
axioms (7)-(11). By extending standard small-step operational
semantics with timepoints and traces, we obtain the small-step
semantics of W . For proving soundness, of this semantics,
we rely on so-called execution-interpretation of a program
execution E: such an interpretation is a model in which for
every (array) variable v the term v(tpi) resp. v(tpi, pos)
is interpreted as the value of v at the execution step in
E corresponding to timepoint tpi – see our Appendix for
more details. We then introduce W-soundness defining the
soundness of the semantics of W , as follows:
Definition 1 (W-Soundness): Let p be a program and let A
be a trace logic property. We say that A is W-sound, if for
any execution-interpretationM we have M  A.
By using structural induction over program statements, we
derive W-soundness of the semantics of W . That is:
Theorem 1 (W-Soundness of Semantics of W): For a given
terminating program p, the trace axioms (7)-(11) areW-sound.
As a consequence, the semantics of any terminating program
p expressed in L, as defined in (6), is W-sound.
E. Program Correctness in Trace Logic L
Let P be a program and F be a first-order property of P ,
with F expressed in L. We use L to express and prove that P
“satisfies” F , that is P is partially correct w.r.t. F , as follows:
1) We express JP K in L, as discussed in Section IV-C;
2) We prove the partial correctness of P with respect to F ;
that is, we prove
JP K N∪I F.
In what follows, we first discuss (relational) properties F
expressed in L (Section V) and then focus on proving partial
correctness using L (Section VI).
V. HYPERPROPERTIES IN TRACE LOGIC
We demonstrate the expressiveness of trace logic L by
encoding non-interference [11] and sensitivity [12], two fun-
damental security properties. This secition also showcases the
generic lemmas, similar to property (2), introduced by our
work to automate the verification of hyperproperties. The
examples considered in this section are deemed as insecure
by existing syntax-driven, non-interference verification tech-
niques, such as [11], [13].
a) Non-interference: Non-interference [1] is a security
property that prevents information flow from confidential data
to public channels. It is a so-called 2-safety property express-
ing that, given two runs of a program containing high and low
confidentiality variables, denoted by H and L respectively, if
the input for all L variables is the same in both runs, the
output of the computation should result in the same values for
L variables in both traces regardless of the initial value of any
H variable. Intuitively, this means that no private input leaks
to any public sink. In what follows, we let lo denote an L
variable and hi an H variable.
We formalize non-interference in trace logic L as follows.
Let l0 denote the first timepoint of the execution and let
EqTr(v, tp) denote that v has the same value(s) in both traces
at timepoint tp, that is:
EqTr(v, tp) :=

∀posI.v(tp, pos, t1)≃ v(tp, pos, t2)) if v is mutable array
∀posI.v(pos, t1)≃ v(pos, t2)) if v is constant array
v(tp, t1)≃ v(tp, t2)) if v is mutable var.
v(t1)≃ v(t2) if v is constant var.
We then express non-interference as:
(
∧
v∈L
EqTr(v, l0)) → (
∧
v∈L
EqTr(v, lend )). (12)
Example 3: Consider the program illustrated in Figure 2a,
which branches on an H guard. In the two branches, however,
the L variable is updated in the same way, thereby not leaking
1 func main()
2 {
3 const Int hi;
4 Int lo;
5
6 if(hi > 0)
7 {
8 lo = lo + 1;
9 }
10 else
11 {
12 lo = lo + 1;
13 }
14 }
(a) Branching on a high variable.
1 func main()
2 {
3 const Int k;
4 const Int lo;
5 Int hi = lo;
6 Int i = 0;
7 Int[] output;
8
9 while(hi < k)
10 {
11 output[i] = hi;
12 hi = hi + 1;
13 i = i + 1;
14 }
15 }
(b) Explicit flow.
Fig. 2: Examples with non-interference behaviour.
anything about the guard. The non-interference property for
this program is a special instance of property (12), as follows:
EqTr(lo, l0)→ EqTr (lo, lend). (13)
By adjusting superposition reasoning to trace logic L (see
Section VI), we can automatically verify the property above.
Traditional information-flow type systems [11] would however
fail to prove this program secure, as they prevent any branch-
ing on H guards. More permissive static analysis techniques
based on program dependency graphs, such as JOANA [13],
would also classify this program as insecure. 
Let us now focus on another interesting security example.
Example 4: Figure 2b models an interactive program out-
putting on a public channel. The array variable output ∈ L
models the number and content of these outputs, which is
determined by the loop. At a first glance, this program might
look insecure because of the explicit flow at l11. Furthermore,
the number of outputs, as well as their content, could also
leak information about the secret. Indeed, value-insensitive
information-flow type systems [11] would consider this pro-
gram to be insecure. In this specific case, however, the H
variable in the loop guard is reset with an L input, and the
program satisfies non-interference. As our semantic reasoning
in trace logic L is value sensitive, our work correctly validates
1 func main()
2 {
3 const Int[] a;
4 const Int alength;
5 const Int z;
6 Int x = 0;
7 Int i = 0;
8
9 while(i < alength)
10 {
11 x = x + a[i];
12 i = i + 1;
13 }
14 x = x + z;
15 }
Fig. 3: Example adhering sensitivity
Figure 2b. proving it to be secure. Specifically, we prove the
following property, stating that if all variables in L are equal at
the beginning of the execution, then the values of the output
array are equal after the execution:
(EqTr (k, l11) ∧ EqTr(lo, l11) ∧ EqTr(output , l11))
→ EqTr(output, lend)
(14)

b) Sensitivity: Sensitivity is a property describing how
much a program amplifies the distance of its inputs, which is at
the core of the Laplace mechanism used to enforce differential
privacy [12]. Let the integer k denote the deviation, and let
OUT be the set of program variables that appear in the output
after the execution of the program. We can then formally
define sensitivity as follows:
∀kI, v∈OUT .
(
|v(l0, t1)− v(l0, t2)| < k
→ |v(lend, t1)− v(lend, t2)| < k
) (15)
Example 5: In Figure 3, the contents of an array a are
summed up into a variable x. We prove that if the values of
some variable z differ by at most k between two traces while
all other array elements are equal, then the final values of x
in these two traces will differ from each other by at most k
as well. We express this property in trace logic L as:
∀kI.
(
EqT (a, l6) ∧ EqT (alength, l6) ∧ |z(t1)− z(t2)| < k
→ |x(lend, t1)− x(lend, t2)| < k
)
(16)

Our framework generates and relies upon a set of generic
trace lemmas for hyperproperties, similar to lemma (2). We
now illustrate two further such lemmas.
c) Simultaneous-loop-termination: Our semantic formal-
ization ofW in trace logic L defines ns(t1) to be the smallest
iteration, in which the loop condition does not hold in trace t1.
Due to well-founded orderings over naturals, there can only be
one iteration with such a property. Thus, if we can conclude
this property for any other trace, say t2, then it must be the
case that ns(t2)≃ns(t1). In our work we therefore generate
and use the following trace lemma in L (for simplicity, we
omit the enclosing iterators):
(
∀it.
(
it < ns(t1)→ JCondK(ls(it), t2)
)
∧
¬JCondK(ls(ns(t1)), t2)
)
→ ns(t2)≃ns(t1)
(17)
Property (17) is essential to prove that the loops in both traces
have the same last iteration, and therefore terminate after the
same number of iterations.
d) Equality-preservation-arrays: For an array variable a
and loop location l, let Eqa(it, pos) denote that a at position
pos has the same value in both traces at iteration it of the loop:
Eqa(it, pos) := a(l(it), pos, t1)≃ a(l(it), pos, t2).
The following lemma over array variables is similar to the
equality-preservation-lemma (2):
∀posI.∀it
′
N
.((
Eqa(0, pos) ∧ ∀itN.((it < it
′ ∧ Eqa(it, pos))
→ Eqa(succ(it), pos))
)
→ Eqa(it
′, pos)
) (18)
We conclude by emphasizing that trace lemmas, such as (17)
and (18), are expressed in trace logic L and automatically
generated by our approach.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
A. Implementation
We implemented our approach in the tool RAPID1, which
consists of nearly 13,000 lines of C++ code. RAPID takes as
input a program written in W and a property expressed in
trace logic L. It then generates axioms written in trace logic
L corresponding to the semantics of the program and outputs
both the axioms and the property in the SMT-LIB syntax [14].
The produced SMT-LIB encoding is further passed within
RAPID to the first-order theorem prover VAMPIRE for proving
validity of the property (i.e. partial correctness). VAMPIRE
searches for a refutation of the desired property by saturating
the provided encoding with respect to a set of inference rules
such as resolution and superposition [10].
a) Inductive Reasoning: Trace logic L encodes loop-
iterations using counters of sort N. Hence, there are conse-
quences of the semantics which can only be derived using
inductive reasoning. Automating induction is however chal-
lenging: state-of-the-art SMT solvers and theorem-provers are
not able to automatically infer and prove most (inductive)
consequences needed by RAPID. In order to address this
problem, (i) we identified some of the most important ap-
plications of induction that are useful for many programs and
(ii) formulated the corresponding inductive properties in trace
logic as trace lemmas. Some of these lemmas are described
in Section II and Section V. Each trace lemma is logically
implied by standard induction axioms of natural numbers and
the semantics of the program. RAPID generates trace lemmas
for each variable and each loop of the program and adds them
as axioms to its SMT-LIB output.
1https://github.com/gleiss/rapid
b) Theory Reasoning: Reasoning with theories in the
presence of quantifiers is yet another challenge for automated
reasoners, and hence for VAMPIRE. Different theory encodings
lead to very different results. In RAPID, we model integers
using the built-in support for integers in VAMPIRE. We exper-
imented with various sound but incomplete axiomatization of
integers. We used VAMPIRE with all its built-in theory axioms
(option -tha on, default), as well as with a partial, but most
relevant set of theory axioms (option -tha some) which we
extended with specific integer theory axioms. Natural numbers
are modeled in RAPID as a term algebra (0, succ, pred), for
which efficient reasoning engines already exist [15]. In order
to express the ordering of natural numbers, we manually add
the symbol<, together with an (incomplete) axiomatization. In
RAPID, we also experimented with clause splitting by calling
VAMPIRE both with and without its AVATAR framework [16]
(options -av on/off, with on as default).
B. Benchmarks and Experimental Results
To compensate the lack of general benchmarks for first-
order hyperproperties, we collected a set of 27 verification
problems for evaluating our work in RAPID. Our benchmarks
describe 2-safety properties relevant in the security domain,
such as non-interference and sensitivity. The individual bench-
mark programs consist of up to 50 lines of code each.
RAPID produced the SMT-LIB-encodings for each bench-
mark in less than a second. These encodings were passed
to VAMPIRE, as well as to the SMT solvers Z3 [17] and
CVC4 [18] for comparison purposes, to establish the cor-
rectness of the input property. We ran each prover with a 60
seconds time limit. All experiments were carried out on an
Intel Core i5 3.1Ghz machine with 16 GB of RAM.
Our experimental results are summarized in Table I. The
first four columns report on results by running VAMPIRE
on the RAPID output. The columns denoted with S/F refer
to VAMPIRE options for partial/full theory reasoning (option
-tha some/on) respectively. A refers to the use of the
AVATAR (option -av on) in conjunction with one of the
theory options, hence columns S+A and F+A. The last two
columns of Table I summarize our results of running Z3
and CVC4 on the RAPID output. The rows denoted To-
tal VAMPIRE and Unique VAMPIRE sum up the total and
unique numbers of examples proven with the setting of the
corresponding column. Example 4-hw-swap-in-array
in Table I is our running example from Figure 1, whereas
the benchmarks 3-ni-high-guard-equal-branches
and 9-ni-equal-output correspond to Figure 2a and
Figure 2b, respectively.
VAMPIRE proved 25 RAPID encodings out of the 27 bench-
mark problems. Table I shows that the option S+A seems to
be the most successful, with four unique benchmarks proven.
While two of our benchmarks were not proven by VAMPIRE
with our current set of automatically generated RAPID lemmas,
these problems could actually be proved by VAMPIRE by using
only a subset of trace lemmas, i.e. by removing unnecessary
lemmas manually. Improving theory reasoning in VAMPIRE,
Benchmarks
Vampire
CVC4 Z3
S S+A F F+A
1-hw-equal-arrays X X - X X X
2-hw-last-position-swapped - X - - X X
3-hw-swap-and-two-arrays - X - - - -
4-hw-swap-in-array-lemma - X - - - -
4-hw-swap-in-array-full - X - - - -
1-ni-assign-to-high X X X X X X
2-ni-branch-on-high-twice X X X X X X
3-ni-high-guard-equal-branches X X X X X X
4-ni-branch-on-high-twice-prop2 X X - - X X
5-ni-temp-impl-flow - - X X X X
6-ni-branch-assign-equal-val - - X X X X
7-ni-explicit-flow X X X X X X
8-ni-explicit-flow-while X X - X X X
9-ni-equal-output X - - - - X
10-ni-rsa-exponentiation X X X X X -
1-sens-equal-sums X X X X X X
2-sens-equal-sums-two-arrays X X X X - -
3-sens-abs-diff-up-to-k - - - - X X
4-sens-abs-diff-up-to-k-two-arrays - - - - - -
5-sens-two-arrays-equal-k X X X X - -
6-sens-diff-up-to-explicit-k X X X X - -
7-sens-diff-up-to-explicit-k-sum - - X X - -
8-sens-explicit-swap - - X X - -
9-sens-explicit-swap-prop2 - X X - -
10-sens-equal-k X X X X - -
11-sens-equal-k-twice X X X X - -
12-sens-diff-up-to-forall-k - - X X X -
Total VAMPIRE 15 18 17 19
Unique VAMPIRE 1 4 0 0
Total 25 14 13
TABLE I: RAPID results with VAMPIRE, Z3 and CVC4.
and in general in superposition proving, would further im-
prove the efficiency of RAPID. In particular, designing better
reasoning support for transitive relations like <N and <I is an
interesting further line of research.
We also compared the performance of VAMPIRE on the
RAPID examples to the performance of Z3 and CVC4. Unlike
VAMPIRE, Z3 and CVC4 proved only 13 and 14 examples,
respectively. Our results thus showcase that superposition
reasoning, in particular VAMPIRE, is better suited for proving
first-order hyperproperties, as many of these properties involve
heavy use of quantifiers, including alternations of quantifiers
(such as for example 4-hw-swap-in-array correspond-
ing to Figure 1). Moreover, RAPID proved security of exam-
ples that were classified insecure by existing techniques [11],
[13], such as 3-ni-high-guard-equal-branches and
9-ni-equal-output.
VII. RELATED WORK
Deductive verification. Most verification approaches use a
state-based language to express programs and properties about
them, and use invariants to establish program correctness [19].
Such invariants loosely correspond to a fragment of trace
logic, where formulas only feature universal quantification
over time – but no existential quantification. The lack of
existential, and thus alternating, quantification makes these
works suitable for automation via SMT-solving [20], [21] and
hence applicable for programs where full first-order logic is
not needed, for instance programs involving mainly integer
variables and function calls. For program properties expressed
in full first-order logic, such as over unbounded arrays, existing
methods are yet not able to automatically verify program
correctness. We argue that the missing expressiveness is the
problem here, since one usually needs to be able to express
arbitrary dependencies of timepoints and values, if custom
code is used to iterate through an array or more generally
through a data structure. Our trace logic supports such kind
of first-order reasoning.
Our approach to automate induction using trace lemmas is
related to template-based invariant generation methods [22],
[23]. Our trace lemmas are however more expressive than
existing templates and we automatically derive trace lemmas.
Program analysis by first-order reasoning is also studied
in [24], where program semantics is expressed in extensions
of Hoare Logic with explicit timepoints. Unlike [24], we do
not rely on an intermediate program (Hoare) logic, but reason
also about relational properties. While [24] can only handle
simple loops, our work supports a standard while-language
with explicit locations and arbitrary nestings of statements.
First-order reasoning for program analysus is also addressed
in [25], by introducing dynamic trace logic: an extension of
dynamic logic with modalities for reasoning about traces. A
custom sequent calculus is proposed in [25], implying that
automating the work would require the design of specialised
sequent calculus provers. Unlike [25], our work is fully auto-
mated. Further, our work preserves the control-flow structure
of programs by introducing function symbols and automates
inductive reasoning using trace lemmas.
Relational verification. Verification of relational- and hyper-
properties is an active area of research, with applications in
programming languages and compilers, security and privacy;
see [26] for an overview. Various static analysis techniques
have been proposed to analyze non-interference, such as
type systems [11] and graph dependency analysis [13]. Type
systems proved also effective in the verification of privacy
properties for cryptographic protocols [27]–[31]. Relational
Hoare logic was introduced in [8] and further extended in [6],
[32] for defining product programs to reduce relational verifi-
cation to standard verification. All these works closely tie ver-
ification to the syntactic program structure, thus limiting their
applicability and expressiveness. As already argued, our work
allows proving security of examples that were so far classified
as insecure by some of the aforementioned methods [11], [13].
Recently, [33] encodes relational properties through refinement
types in F* [34]. While still being syntax driven, [33] can
potentially verify semantic properties by using SMT solving,
although this typically requires the manual insertion and proof
of program-dependent lemmas, which is not the case for us.
In [35] bounded model checking is proposed for program
equivalence. Program equivalence is reduced in [36] to proving
a set of Horn clauses, by combining a relational weakest
precondition calculus with SMT-based reasoning. However,
when addressing programs with different control flow as
in [36], user guidance is required for proving program equiv-
alence. Program equivalence is also studied in [37], [38] for
proving information flow properties. Unlike these works, we
are not limited to SMT solving but automate the verification
of relational properties expressed in full first-order theories,
possibly with alternations of quantifiers.
Motivated by applications to translation validation, the work
of [39] develops powerful techniques for proving correctness
of loop transformations. Relational methods for reasoning
about program versions and semantic differences are also
introduced in [40], [41]. Going beyond relational properties,
an SMT-based framework for verifying k-safety properties
is introduced in [42] and further extended [43] for proving
correctness of 3-way merge. While these works focus on high-
level languages, many others consider low-level languages,
see [44]–[47] for some exemplary approaches. Further afield,
several authors have introduced logics for modelling hyper-
properties. Unlike these works, trace logic allows expressing
first-order relational properties and automates reasoning about
such properties by first-order theorem proving, overcoming
thus the SMT-based limitations of quantified reasoning.
Finally, in [48] HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗ is introduced to
model temporal and relational properties properties. However,
these logics support only decidable fragments of first-order
logic and thus cannot handle relational properties with non-
constant function symbols. As such, security and privacy prop-
erties over unbounded data structures/uninterpreted functions
cannot be encoded or verified.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We introduced trace logic for automating the verification
of relational program properties of imperative programs. We
showed that program semantics as well as relational properties
can naturally be encoded in trace logic as first-order properties
over program locations, loop iterations and computation traces.
We combined trace logic with superposition proving and
implemented our work in the RAPID tool. While our work
already outperforms SMT-based approaches, we are convinced
that improving superposition reasoning with both theories and
quantifiers would further strengthen the use of trace logic for
relational verification.
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APPENDIX
A. Small-step operational semantics of W
In this subsection, we recall standard definitions from small-
step operational semantics.
Definition 2: Let p be a program. Then a state σ is a function
which (i) maps each integer-variable v of p to a concrete value
σ(v) ∈ I and (ii) maps each array-variable v and each value
pos ∈ I to a value σ(v, pos) ∈ I.
Definition 3: A configuration is a pair 〈p, σ〉, where we refer
to p as the continuation and σ is a state.
The execution of a single step in the program is defined
by the rules of Figure 4. Our presentation is semantically
equivalent to standard small-step operational semantics, but
differs syntactically in three points, in order to simplify
later definitions and theorems: (i) program-expressions are
evaluated on the fly without introducing explicit steps (ii) the
relation between the state σ in the original configuration and
the state σ′ in the resulting configuration is explicitly described
using a formula (in contrast to using the same variable σ
twice) and (iii) we annotate while-statements with counters to
ensure the uniqueness of continuations during the execution,
see Section B.
A program is executed by iteratively transforming the initial
configuration according to the rules of Figure 4 until the
continuation becomes end. We annotate each while-statement
in the initial configuration of the execution with counter 0:
Definition 4: Let p be a program, let p′ be the result of
annotating each while-loop in p with counter 0 and let σ be
an arbitrary state. Then 〈p′, σ〉 is called initial configuration.
σ′ = σ[skip]
〈skip; p, σ〉 =≫ 〈p, σ′〉
σ′ = σ[v 7→ JeK(σ)]
[asg]
〈v := e; p, σ〉 =≫ 〈p, σ′〉
JcK(σ) = true σ′ = σ
[iteT]
〈if(c)then{p1}else{p2}; p, σ〉 =≫
〈p1; p, σ
′〉
JcK(σ) = false σ′ = σ
[iteF]
〈if(c)then{p1}else{p2}; p, σ〉 =≫
〈p2; p, σ
′〉
JcK(σ) = true σ′ = σ
[whileT ]
〈whilei(c)do{p1}; p, σ〉 =≫
〈p1;while
i+1(c)do{p1}; p, σ
′〉
JcK(σ) = false σ′ = σ
[whileF ]
〈whilei(c)do{p1}; p, σ〉 =≫ 〈p, σ
′〉
Fig. 4: Small-step operational semantics of W
Definition 5: Let p be a program and C,C1, C2 be configu-
rations. A partial execution from C1 to C2 is a derivation in the
inference system of small-step operational semantics starting
at C1 and ending in C2. An execution of p is a partial execution
from an initial configuration to a configuration 〈end, σ〉 for an
arbitrary state σ. If there exists a partial execution starting at
the initial configuration and ending in C, we say that C is
reachable.
B. Separating subprograms and state
Our presentation of operational semantics features counters.
We now show that as a result, if r1 and r2 are continuations
occuring in the same execution, then r1 and r2 are different.
This implies that we do not need to know about the state to
distinguish different configurations and allows us to separate
the continuation from the state.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness): Let p be a program and let 〈r1, σ1〉
and 〈r2, σ2〉 be configurations occuring in the execution of p.
Then r1 6= r2.
Proof: Let p, p1, p2 be subprograms, let s be a single
statement and let C be a condition. Consider the minimal re-
lation >1 which satisfies the following conditions and consider
its transitive closure >.
s; p >1 p
if(C)then{p1}else{p2}; p >1 p1; p
if(C)then{p1}else{p2}; p >1 p2; p
whilei(C)do{p1}; p >1
p1;while
i+1(C)do{p1}; p
It is an easy exercise to establish that > is a strict partial
order on continuations. Next, skip, asg, whileF and end
reduce the ordering according to the first condition, iteT
and iteF reduce the ordering according to the second resp.
third condition and whileT reduce the ordering according to
the fourth condition. In particular, we are able to conclude
r1 > r2, which immediately implies r1 6= r2 due to the
irreflexivity of >.
Having established the uniqueness, we are now able to
speak of the state at a given continuation p (and annotate
it as σ(p)). As a result, a configuration is fully described
by the continuation. We therefore omit the state σ(p) in
any configuration 〈p, σ(p)〉 and write 〈p〉 instead. Finally we
use the fact that we have finitely many program variables
v1, . . . , vn, and split up σ(p) into σv1(p), . . . , σvn(p), which
we simply write as v1(p), . . . , vn(p).
C. Mapping timepoints to continuations
Small-step operational semantics describes only the next
step in an execution, whereas structural semantics, and trace
logic semantics in particular, also describes the complete
execution of each substatement.
Recall that the definitions of starts and ends from Sec-
tion IV-A describe the timepoints of the start, respectively end
of a partial execution of a statement s. To connect the two
worlds of operational and structural semantics we provide a
mapping R from such timepoints to continuations:
Definition 6: Let R be
R(tps) := s;R(ends) if s is non-loop
R(tps(it)) := s
it;R(ends) if s is loop
We are now able to describe configurations using tps, starts
and ends. In particular, we are able to instantiate each rule
to a new rule, whose configurations can be described using
tps, starts and ends. The instantiated rules produce the
same reachable configurations as the original rules, and are
presented in Figure 5.
D. W-Soundness
Operational semantics describe the execution of a program.
Such an execution correseponds to a model where the terms
describing variable values are interpreted according to the
states in the corresponding configurations.
Definition 7 (Execution-interpretation): Let p be a program.
For an arbitrary execution E of p containing configurations
〈R(tp1), σ1〉, . . . , 〈R(tpn), σn〉, let an execution-interpretation
be any interpretation M , such that for any integer/array
variable v the term v(tpi) resp. v(tpi, pos) is interpreted as
σi(v) resp. σi(v[pos]) in M .
With the above definition of execution-interpretations,
soundness is captured as follows:
Definition 8 (W-Soundness): Let p be a program and let A
be a trace logic axiom. Then A is called W-sound, if for any
execution-interpretationM we have M  A.
We show that the axioms of trace logic are W-sound.
Theorem 3 (W-Soundness of Semantics of W): For a given
terminating program p, the axioms of Figure 5 defining the
semantics of W are W-sound.
Let s be a skip-statement. Instantiating the skip-rule with p :=
R(ends) yields
σ′ = σ[skip]
〈R(starts), σ〉 =≫ 〈R(ends), σ
′〉
Let s be an assignment v = e. Instantiating the asg-rule with
p := R(ends) yields
σ′ = σ[v 7→ JeK(σ)]
[asg]
〈R(starts), σ〉 =≫ 〈R(ends), σ
′〉
Let p1 and p2 be s1; . . . ;sk resp. s’1; . . . ;s’k‘ and let s
be if(Cond) {p1} else {p2}. Instantiating the rules iteT and
iteF with p := R(ends) yields the two rules
JcK(σ) = true σ′ = σ
[iteT]
〈R(starts), σ〉 =≫ 〈R(starts1), σ
′〉
JcK(σ) = false σ′ = σ
[iteF]
〈R(starts), σ〉 =≫ 〈R(starts′
1
), σ′〉
Let p1 be s1; . . . ;sk and let s be while(Cond) {p1}. Instan-
tiating the rules whileT and whileF with p := ends yields
the two rules
JcK(σ) = true σ′ = σ
[whileT ]
〈R(tps(it
s)), σ〉 =≫ 〈R(starts1), σ
′〉
JcK(σ) = false σ′ = σ
[whileF ]
〈R(tps(it
s)), σ〉 =≫ 〈R(end s), σ
′〉
Fig. 5: Small-step operational semantics using tp, start , end .
Proof: Consider an arbitrary trace tr and let E be the
execution denoted by tr. LetM be an execution-interpretation
of E. We proceed by structural induction on the program-
structure with the induction hypothesis that for a subprogram
p′ = s1; . . . ; sk, if 〈R(starts1)〉 is reachable our semantics
Jp′K instantiated with tr are W-sound.
Case distinction on the type of the statement s:
• Let s be of the form skip. Assume 〈R(starts)〉
is reachable. Then the only rule which applies
is skip, so 〈R(ends)〉 is also reachable and
σ(R(ends)) = σ(R(starts)). By the definition of
execution-interpretations, we therefore conclude that
axiom 7 is W-sound.
• Let s be of the form v := e. Assume 〈R(starts)〉 is
reachable. Then the only rule which applies is asg,
so 〈R(ends)〉 is also reachable and σ(R(end s)) =
σ(R(starts))[v 7→ JeK(σ(R(start s)))]. By the definition
of execution-interpretations, we therefore conclude that
axiom 8 is W-sound.
• Let s be of the form if(c)then{p1}else{p2}, where
p1 is s1; . . . ; sk. Assume 〈R(starts)〉 is reachable. Each
axiom 10a,10c is an implication with JcK(start s) as posi-
tive premise, so assume that JcK(start s) holds inM . Then
the only applicable rule is iteT . Therefore 〈R(starts1)〉 is
reachable and σ(R(starts1)) = σ(R(starts)). From the
latter fact and the definition of execution-interpretations
we conclude that axiom 10a is W-sound. Furthermore,
since p1 is a subprogram of s, we are able to combine the
reachability of 〈R(startp1)〉 with the induction hypoth-
esis to derive that Jp1K is W-sound. In particular axiom
10c is W-sound. Analogously we are able to prove the
W-soundness of axioms 10b,10d.
• Let s be of the form while(c)do{p1}, where p1
is s1; . . . ; sk. Assume 〈R(starts)〉 is reachable. Axiom
11a and 11b define lastIts as the smallest iteration it
where JcK(tps(it)) does not hold inM . Since we assume
termination, such an iteration needs to exist, and in
particular the definition is well-defined, so axiom 11a and
11b are W-sound.
Now let it be an arbitrary iteration such that it <
lastIts holds in M . By definition, for any iteration
it′ < it, we know that JcK(tps(it′)) holds in M ,
in particular the only applicable rule for 〈R(tps(it′))〉
is whileT . Furthermore 〈R(starts)〉 is reachable and
equal to 〈R(tps(0))〉. Combining both facts we use a
trivial sub-induction to conclude that 〈R(tps(it))〉 is
reachable. Since JcK(tps(it)) holds, the only applicable
rule is whileT , so 〈R(starts1(it))〉 is reachable and
σ(R(starts1(it))) = σ(R(tpwhile(it))). From this we
conclude that axiom 11c is W-sound by the definition
of execution-interpretations. Next, p1 is a subexpression
of s, so we are able to combine the reachability of
〈R(startp1(it))〉 with the induction hypothesis to con-
clude that Jp1K is W-sound. Therefore, axiom 11d is W-
sound.
Finally, for any iteration it < lastIts, we know that
JcK(tps(it)) holds inM , so a similar trivial sub-induction
yields that 〈R(tps(lastIts))〉 is reachable. By definition
of lastIts, JcK(tps(it′)) does not hold in M , so the
only applicable rule is whileF . Therefore, 〈R(ends)〉
is reachable and σ(R(end s)) = σ(R(tps(lastIts))). In
particular, Axiom 11e is W-sound.
Finally the initial state of an execution is reachable, so we can
apply the induction hypothesis to establish the W-soundness
of our semantics.
